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On the cold evening of 29 January 1907 Sergei Witte, constitutional Russia’s first Prime 
Minister, discovered a belated and wholly unexpected Christmas present lodged in one of 
his chimneys: an unexploded time-bomb.1 Superficially, this case of attempted murder 
was a trivial enough affair. The bomb was so poorly constructed that it could hardly be 
considered dangerous: the detonator malfunctioned and the clock had stopped. Sergei 
Witte was, in any case, no longer a government minister, he had fallen out of favour with 
the tsar and had ceased to be an influential political figure. Moreover, the culprits eluded 
arrest and consequently the motives for the attack remained unclear at first.  
Yet, all this changed as the Petersburg winter slowly gave way to summer. On 27 
May 1907 ‘some children found the disfigured and unrecognisable corpse of a young 
man near the Irinovskii railway line, about seven kilometres outside St. Petersburg.’2 
Police found bomb-making materials around the body. Just over two weeks later the 
Socialist Revolutionary (SR) party organ Znamia truda published an article which was 
circulated throughout constitutional Russia’s vibrant new free press revealing that the 
victim’s name was Aleksandr Kazantsev and that the bomb found on his corpse had been 
intended for another attempt on Witte’s life.3 The article went on to claim that Kazantsev 
had been an agent provocateur in the service of the Union of Russian People (URP), an 
extreme right-wing political group which had been formed in 1905 as a ‘patriotic’ 
reaction against Witte’s promise of a constitution in the so-called October Manifesto. 
Subsequent exposés in the press filtering from SR sources revealed that Kazantsev had 
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been responsible for terrorist attacks on several of Russia’s leading liberal politicians, 
including the January attempt on Witte’s life.4 The principal source of this information 
was Kazantsev’s murderer, a left-winger, 23 year-old Vasilii Dmitriev Fedorov, who had 
escaped to France and sold his story to the scandal-hungry Parisian press. He claimed that 
the murder was an act of revenge for the fact that Kazantsev had duped him into carrying 
out assassinations based on the lie that there were at the behest of the SR party.5 
 The controversy escalated when rumours surfaced in the St. Petersburg press that 
Kazantsev’s address book, which was found at the scene of the crime, included the phone 
numbers of the offices of the secret police (Security Section) in Moscow, the head of 
Moscow’s secret police from 1906 to 1907 (E.K.Klimovich), the current Governor 
General of Moscow (Gershel’man) and the addresses of some Okhrana ‘conspiratorial 
apartments’ (konspirativnye kvartiry, i.e. safe houses).6 On the basis of this, Sergei Witte 
was not alone in concluding that: ‘Kazantsev was one of the agents of the Okhrana who 
were termed ideological volunteers [ideinymi dobrovol’tsami], working for the secret 
police in assassinating persons who were considered left-wing and in general dangerous 
to the reactionary cause.’7 This article will explore the validity of Witte’s contention. It 
will also examine the broader significance of the affair. I will begin by identifying three 
themes which underpin the various explanations of the causes and implications of the 
Okhrana’s connection with reactionary terror. 
 
i) A War against society? Right-wing terror was concentrated on the moderate liberal 
parties: police connections to this have been taken as manifest proof for the nascent 
liberal critique of the tsarist state as an anachronistic and unyielding monolith, focussing 
on the Okhrana as the central ‘pillar of Russian reaction.’8 The liberal critique often 
contained prophetic elements, voiced most clearly by A.A.Lopukhin, a former police 
chief (1902-1905) who became disillusioned with the tsarist regime and gravitated 
towards the liberal Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) party. ‘The whole political outlook 
of the ranks of the Corps of Gendarmes boils down to the following propositions’ he 
wrote, ‘there is the people and there is the state... As a result [of this bipolar view], the 
protection of the state... turns into a war against all of society... By widening the gulf 
between the state and the people, the police engender a revolution.’9 
ii) State terror? The Witte affair also suggests a convergence of police methods and 
terrorism in Russia prior to the Red Terror of Lenin’s Cheka. One might say that the 
creed and methodology of the Okhrana, which they termed ‘conspiracy’ (konspirativnost’ 
or konspiratsiia), was conceived by ex-revolutionaries recruited by the police (Sergei 
Zubatov, head of Moscow Okhrana in the 1890s, and Petr Rachkovskii, head of the 
Okhrana’s Paris-based Foreign Agency from 1884 to 1902, in particular). They brought 
with them many of the organisational practices the Nechaevist and People’s Will terrorist 
groups from the 1860s to the 1880s. The Witte affair is one of many which suggests that 
the association with organisational and psychological principles of terrorism had 
progressed to the ultimate stage of development whereby the counter-terrorist security 
police finally became itself an agency of terror.10 Analysis on these lines has often drawn 
attention to rumours of the Okhrana terrorising the government itself. In this sense the 
Witte assassination attempt may be seen as a bathetic precursor to the murder of the 
Prime Minister, P.A.Stolypin, by an Okhrana spy, Dmitrii Bogrov, in September 1911. 
History played out Marx’s satirical observation on great events in reverse: first time as 
farce, second time as tragedy. A.I.Guchkov, the leader of the moderate conservative 
Octobrist party, summed up the general impression of the Stolypin murder when he asked 
in the Duma: Was this an accident? ‘… or behind it was there something worse, a 
conscious connivance, a desire to get rid of a man whose presence had become 
intolerable?’11 There is much in the case to support A.Ia.Avrekh’s summary that the 
assassination: ‘appears to have been a singular accident, permitted by fools and 
bunglers.’12 Yet, the incomplete interrogation followed by hasty execution of Bogrov 
suggests that the tsarist government was reluctant to delve too deeply into the mystery.13 
A similar reluctance could be seen in the Witte affair. Both cases gave rise to accusations 
at the time and later that the secret police in Russia became (or as some would say had 
always been) a ‘state within a state’14 prior to the Bolshevik police tyranny. 
  
iii) Patron-client networks 
Finally, a theme of this article, which tends to undermine many aspects of the liberal 
critique: the Witte affair offers a glimpse into the murky underworld of tsarist 
bureaucratic politics. This glimpse reveals that, contrary to its monolithic image, the 
bureaucracy was a tangled web of ever-changing and interwoven factions, which have 
been termed ‘patron-client networks.’ These were based not just on institutional 
affiliation, but also on a wide variety of political beliefs, blood-ties, careerism and 
geography.15 Staff relations inside the Okhrana provide a classic example of these 
competing cabals. This indicates that the government did not present a united front in 
opposition to the advent of ‘constitutional’ politics. Far from waging war on society, 
factions in the bureaucracy waged war on one another, seeking to harness the power 
inherent in burgeoning sections of civil society for their own advantage. I will show that 
these bureaucratic cliques and their connections to civil society in Imperial Russia are the 
most important factor in the Witte affair, because they explain the root causes of the 
attempt on Witte’s life and the ensuing scandal.  
The spread of patron-client groups inside the Russian bureaucracy is particularly 
important with regard to the connections between tsarist and Soviet government with 
regard to state terror, because the epidemic of networks reached fever pitch during the 
Great Terror (suggesting at least circumstantially a link.)  The most significant 
denunciation of patron-client networks in Russian government was delivered, with 
characteristic hypocrisy (or doublethink), by the most persistent and successful 
practitioner of the patronage system, Joseph Stalin. In 1937 he warned party members of 
the insidious tendency that ‘most often, workers [party workers, i.e. government officials] 
are selected not by objective criteria, but by accidental, subjective, narrow and provincial 
criteria. Most frequently so-called acquaintances are chosen, personal friends, fellow 
countrymen, people personally devoted to someone, masters of eulogising their patrons, 
regardless of their political and business suitability. Naturally, instead of a leading group 
of responsible workers, a family group of intimates, a company is formed, the members 
of which try to live in peace, not to offend each other, not to wash their dirty linen in 
public…’16 
 
The Holy Brotherhood 
The case of the Holy Brotherhood (Sviashchennaia druzhina, 1881-83) offers an 
interesting precedent on the theme of reactionary terror.17 This organisation, like the 
URP, saw itself as a patriotic reaction against left-wing threats to the tsarist regime. It 
also sought to fight fire with fire by attacking the revolutionary movement with 
conspiratorial terrorist methods.18 Its conspiratorial cells were directly modelled on the 
Nechaevist and People’s Will piaterki (‘groups of five.’)19 The Holy Brotherhood also 
indulged in acts of provocation; that is, it recruited revolutionaries under false pretences 
in order to compromise them. Pavl Akselrod and M.P.Dragomanov were their most 
distinguished dupes.20 Finally and most importantly, like the URP, later revelations about 
the membership of this organisation revealed that it included a large number of police 
officials. These included: Kozlov (the oberpolitseimeister of St Petersburg); Henri Bint (a 
French agent of the Third Section who went on to serve both the Okhrana and the 
Soviets); P.I.Rachkovskii (at that time a lowly clerk in the Department of Police, later to 
become the head of the Okhrana from 1905 to 1906); and secret agents such as 
Iu.M.Bogushevich, G.S.Veselitskii-Bozhidarovich and V.V.Marchenko/Savchenko.21 
These links have led many to conclude that the Holy Brotherhood was an organ of police 
terror. This has a direct bearing on the events of 1907 because these facts were only first 
brought to light around 1911 in order to serve as a key piece of evidence in the Kadet 
accusations, in connection with the Witte affair, that the police had been orchestrating 
right-wing terror for decades.22 
Yet, this conclusion ignores two key factors which would have a bearing on the 
Witte affair. Firstly, the real locus of governmental support for the Brotherhood resided 
among influential figures at court, most notably Count I.I.Vorontsov-Dashkov, 
R.A.Fadeev and Count P.P.Shuvalov. Vorontsov-Dashkov in particular had his own 
police organisations that would benefit from the dissolution of the Okhrana.23 Secondly, 
all the secret police employees listed above had, before entering the Brotherhood, been 
either dismissed or demoted as a result of the creation of the Okhrana: because the 
Department of Police had sought to purge the political police of former employees from 
the discredited Third Section.24 This group of ousted and junior police staff joined the 
Brotherhood with the hope of winning the patronage of this rival group at Court. The 
Brotherhood was therefore set up as a specific reaction against the new leaders of the 
political police. 
It is no surprise to find therefore that the leading police staff saw the Holy 
Brotherhood as a rival, not an ally. Colonel Sudeikin, head of the Okhrana in St 
Petersburg noted, ‘we have to fight against it as much as against the terrorists. Even more 
for it is harder to reach. The revolutionaries are people, they have ideals, but this crowd... 
it is a mob! A mob under protection. They are annoying me no end.’25 The majority of 
senior Okhrana staff thought likewise.26 It was only when the tsar himself withdrew his 
support for the organisation at the end of 1882 that police director V.K.Plehve was able 
to dissolve the Holy Brotherhood.  
 What is more interesting about the Holy Brotherhood, with regard to Witte affair, 
is that Witte himself was a member, and thus himself a forefather of the reactionary terror 
which nearly cost him his life. Indeed, one of the Brotherhood’s chief opponents, 
Russia’s ‘press tsar,’ A.S.Suvorin, wrote: ‘The infamous Holy Brotherhood was Witte’s 
idea. He came from Kiev and explained it all to Vorontsov-Dashkov. An idea worthy of a 
Jesuit.’27 Witte by his own confession did not mince his words, summarising his line of 
reasoning thus: ‘Every time the anarchists prepared or made an attempt on the life of the 
Sovereign, the society should respond by ruthlessly killing them.’28 
 
Witte amidst the secret police 
Next we come to the contemporary liberal interpretation of the attempt on Witte’s life as 
evidence that the Okhrana was somehow a state within the state, a ‘separate realm’, akin 
to Ivan the Terrible’s oprichnina.29 By inference the Okhrana’s alleged terrorist activities 
were seen to be rooted in its elevated status. The depiction of the Okhrana in Witte’s 
memoirs compounds this view. The leading security police officer, he wrote, ‘had more 
influence over the Emperor than I did and was virtually head of the government for 
which I bore responsibility.’30 Even as Prime Minister, Witte claimed that he was unable 
to penetrate the veil of secrecy surrounding the Okhrana and that he: ‘knew nothing about 
police operations except that there was something unclean about them.’31  
Yet the closer we look at the tsarist bureaucracy the more this cliché of an 
impenetrable secret police appears to be misleading. We may take the manoeuvrings of 
Sergei Witte himself as a perfect example of the way in which the Okhrana was an 
integrated and subordinate branch of the bureaucratic government. He became a close 
ally of a fellow former-member of the Holy Brotherhood, P.I.Rachkovskii. The alliance 
was largely a marriage of convenience- Rachkovskii was, like Witte, an inveterate enemy 
of Viacheslav Plehve. Yet, in his relations with Rachkovskii, Witte was hardly innocent 
of association with the seamy side of the Okhrana. It was even rumoured that Witte found 
Rachkovskii useful in some of his more unscrupulous personal intrigues, such as 
arranging the theft of papers from the home of Elie de Cyon (Ilia Tsion).32 Further 
unsubstantiated accusations circulated that Rachkovskii occasionally resorted to terrorist 
methods. For example, when the Department of Police sent a senior gendarme, General 
Selivestrov, to Paris to investigate Rachkovskii for embezzlement of government funds in 
1892, the general had the misfortune to be assassinated by one of Rachkovskii’s own 
spies.33 Moreover, while probably not an anti-Semite himself, Rachkovskii was a pioneer 
in the crude politics of mass media anti-Semitism.34 Later allegations that Rachkovskii 
was the author of the notorious anti-Semitic forgery ‘The Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ 
were probably false, but all the same were indicative of his sinister reputation.35 
Rachkovskii clearly represents a link between the Holy Brotherhood and the URP: 
Having been a member of the former and having claimed to be the founder of the latter.36 
Moreover, this does not prove long-standing right-wing connections to the 
Okhrana as a whole. Quite the contrary: Rachkovskii was very unpopular among the 
mainstream okhranniki. Rachkovskii’s career survived thanks to patronage in the 
Imperial Court. When he lost this support, in 1902, the Interior Minister, Plehve, lost no 
time in dismissing him.37 Witte’s promotion of more unscrupulous agents inside the 
political police did not end here. He actively sought to re-establish influence over the 
Okhrana by cultivating and promoting the career of I.F.Manasevich-Manuilov, a 
specialist in burglary and blackmail.38 Witte employed Manuilov in a secret bid for the 
support of the disgraced police chief Sergei Zubatov in December 1905.39 When he 
became effective Prime Minister at the end of 1905, Witte appointed the highly 
conservative P.N.Durnovo as Minister of the Interior- ahead of more liberal candidates. 
This was based on the calculation that Durnovo was so unpopular that he would be 
dependent on Witte’s patronage. 
Thus, the prevalence of patron-client networks in the Okhrana indicates that it 
was not a ‘separate realm,’ hermetically sealed off from the rest of the government. In 
fact, factional struggles for control of the Okhrana transcended departmental parameters. 
Witte was a key figure in this internal wrangling. If anything, prior to 1905 he was closer 
to the reactionary, rather than liberal, factions inside the political police.40  The irony was 
that if Witte wanted to weave a thread of continuity to prove police complicity in the 
attempt on his life then he would have to find himself guilty also. 
 
Komissarov’s pogrom laboratory 
Next we come to the question: If Witte was not a paragon of the liberal cause, why would 
the supposedly reactionary Okhrana want to murder, or at least aid and abet the murder, 
of the former-Prime Minister? Witte put forward the idea that it was his role as architect 
to the liberal October Manifesto that made him so loathed. Kadet investigators would 
have supported this because it fitted in with their thesis of the fundamental 
incompatibility of political police with the new constitutional order. 
However, evidence points to an alternative explanation: Witte’s connection to the 
political police, not his alienation from them, may have a bearing on the ‘conspiracy’ to 
aid the reactionary assassins. By early 1906 control of the political police had slipped out 
of Witte’s hands because Durnovo grew increasingly independent of the Prime 
Minister,41 and Rachkovskii had long since found a more influential patron in the form of 
Petersburg Governor and later Court Komendant, D.F.Trepov. Yet all was not lost. An 
opportunity for Witte to remove his rivals in the Okhrana presented itself in January 
1906. A former Director of the Department of Police, A.A.Lopukhin, supplied Witte with 
information indicating that a secret section inside the police headquarters, Fontanka 16, 
headed by Rachkovskii and run by a certain Captain M.S.Komissarov, specialised in 
printing inflammatory anti-Semitic proclamations.42 This was a serious charge: A wave 
of bloody pogroms causing thousands of deaths occurred from late 1905 to mid-1906 as a 
reaction against the October Manifesto.43 If there were evidence that the police were 
behind these atrocities then it would prove Lopukhin’s contention that the police were 
orchestrating a general war against ‘society’ and specifically against the constitutional 
order.  
Witte later wrote that he questioned Komissarov on the matter. One version of 
this conversation, which was widely publicised, alleged that Komissarov presumed the 
meeting was to arrange further work and proudly admitted to Witte, ‘we arrange pogroms 
to order – for ten [pogroms] or ten thousand as you wish.’44 Witte confirmed in his 
memoirs that the captain confessed to printing ‘patriotic’ proclamations entitled ‘To the 
Soldiers’,45 but agreed to ‘throw the press in the Neva’ when Witte expressed his 
opposition to the scheme. However, Lopukhin later informed Witte that Komissarov had 
merely moved the press from the Fontanka basement to his own apartment.46 Records 
show that the Minister of the Interior, Durnovo, protected Komissarov from dismissal.47 
 It is important to note that this was not simply an attempt by civil society and the 
nascent Duma to regulate bureaucratic malpractice. This was an internal bureaucratic 
struggle that branched out into the public sphere. The key players in the liberal camp, 
Lopukhin and his brother-in-law Prince S.D.Urusov, were former government officials 
with supporters inside the bureaucracy who wished to remove their opponents, Durnovo 
and Rachkovskii, through creating a public scandal.48 Witte pursued further investigations 
into the matter through his agent attached to the police, Manasevich-Manuilov. Like 
Urusov and Lopukhin, Manuilov harboured a grudge against Durnovo and Rachkovskii 
because they had blocked his career in the Okhrana. In addition to this, Manuilov also 
had reason to attack Komissarov: He had been a rival of Komissarov since 1904 when 
both had spied on the reactions of foreign embassies to the Russo-Japanese war. 
Komissarov’s detailed reports had exposed Manuilov’s ineptitude.49 The question of 
gendarme complicity in pogroms became a forceful issue when one of Lopukhin’s allies 
leaked information to the press in May 1906 implicating a gendarme captain in 
circulating anti-Semitic publications in Aleksandrovsk.50 The issue was taken up again by 
Urusov, who had become a liberal (Kadet) deputy in the Russian parliament, when- 
referring to the infamous Fontanka 16 police headquarters as a ‘pogrom laboratory’- he 
publicly reiterated from the Duma tribune Lopukhin’s accusations against the Okhrana.51 
Consequently, the Duma established a special commission of mostly Jewish deputies to 
investigate the causes of the Belostok pogrom.52 
 Komissarov’s version of events provides further evidence that the affair was part 
of an ongoing internal bureaucratic struggle. He claimed that Lopukhin’s allies within the 
Department of Police53 (viz. the very same people who were later to expose his activities) 
had actually ordered his establishment of a secret pro-government printing press.54 Thus, 
Komissarov suspected afterwards that the press had been a ruse from the start. This belief 
was based on the fact that he was invited to meet with Lopukhin and Prince Urusov only 
a day after he had ‘secretly’ printed the leaflets. At this meeting he alleged that, 
‘Lopukhin cautiously initiated me into the struggle that was at that time going on between 
Count Witte and Durnovo’; and that Lopukhin said to him: ‘Do you see, we have here a 
card game, and in the game sometimes a little spade is useful.’55  The captain was 
obliquely offered the opportunity to escape punishment for the pogrom-press if he placed 
the blame for the publications on P.I.Rachkovskii and through him on Durnovo. 
Komissarov, apparently offended at being referred to as a ‘little spade,’ refused to 
commit himself to Witte’s side in the feud. As a result he was summoned to Witte’s 
office two days later and was reprimanded about the ‘secret’ printing press and told to 
cease activities immediately.56  
The Komissarov affair is important in the specific context of the Witte case 
because the idea of police complicity in the atrocities of the extreme-right had been 
firmly planted in Witte’s mind a year before the attempt on his life.57 Secondly, this 
establishes a motive for at least one member of the Okhrana nourishing an enmity 
towards Sergei Witte: Komissarov felt that Witte had cynically sullied his reputation in 
an attempt to oust Durnovo. Manasevich-Manuilov testified to Komissarov’s resentment 
of the affair. Manuilov claimed that Komissarov suspected him of betraying the 
information about the printing press and consequently, ‘from this moment onwards, the 
Security Section [in Petersburg], which was wholly under the power of Komissarov, 
began against me a most vile campaign, employing various dirty tricks.’58 This 
culminated in Manuilov’s arrest by St Petersburg Security Section in 1910.59 
Thus, Witte was probably correct in claiming that members of the political police 
with connections to the extreme-right considered him their enemy. However, the 
Komissarov affair seems to suggest that Witte made enemies in the Okhrana not because 
he was the author of the October Manifesto, but because he himself was embroiled in 
internal struggle for control of the secret police. 
 
Terror rooted in Russian society 
And this brings us again to the origins of police terror: Far from being rooted in a 
confrontation between state and society, the exact opposite appears to be the case. In 
other words, ‘police terror’ was the direct result of attempts by the political police to 
work with, not against, society. A profusion right-wing societies and unions emerged 
after the October Manifesto. In many ways these organisations appeared to be tailor-
made for an alliance with the conservative wing of the government. The largest and most 
important of these groups was the Union of the Russian People under Dr.A.I.Dubrovin, 
N.E.Markov and V.M.Purishkevich. The URP was particularly attractive to the 
government because it offered the opportunity of mass-based organised support for 
tsarism, last glimpsed in the form of Zubatov’s police trade unions, which might redirect 
the pent-up energies of the discontented lower-classes into a counter-revolutionary 
movement. Any prospective alliance with the extreme-right was in part an attempt by the 
tsarist regime to connect itself to a broad section of society: to forge a union, as it were, 
with the Russian people (narod). So the government’s promotion of the extreme-right, 
particularly through considerable financial grants to as many as 30 of their newspapers, 
which continued in various forms up to 1917, was in one sense an interaction with civil 
society. 60  
However, for many this alliance was something more sinister: a government 
attempt to control society, rather than work with it. The right-wing organisations were 
used as publishers, distributors, filters and fronts for anti-oppositionist pamphlets written 
by Okhrana employees, with print runs of up to 100,000.61 Gerasimov, the head of 
Petersburg Security Section, 1905-1909, claimed that these organisations, ‘only existed 
thanks to the support of the government.’62 Rumours circulated that the URP was an 
artificial creation of the Okhrana. 63 Indeed, the government did not stop at mere financial 
support: In December 1905 Major-General V.A.Dediulin, the St. Petersburg City 
Governor, issued hundreds of revolvers to members of right-wing parties, including the 
URP, that then organised themselves into volunteer policing units knows as 
‘brotherhoods’ (druzhiny). The Okhrana, with its conspiratorial methods and obscure 
funding, impenetrable to Duma budgetary committees, proved to be the ideal 
organisation to co-ordinate this morally dubious manipulation of the political climate. 
Consequently, ties with the extreme-right became so tight that, as Witte put it, ‘the 
Okhrana and the Union of the Russian People were so closely linked that it was difficult 
to mark the boundary between the two bodies.’64 Dr. Dubrovin was a regular guest at 
Rachkovskii’s lavish soirees. Police spies rose to active and senior positions in the URP: 
for example S.Ia.Iakovlev made no secret of the fact that he continued to work for St. 
Petersburg Security Section while holding a fairly senior position in the URP.65 
K.K.Poltoratskii rose to head the Moscow branch of the URP while working as a spy for 
Moscow Security Section.66 
Does this mean that the extreme-right was merely a puppet of the Department of 
Police? The extreme-right categorically denied, and indeed resented, the accusation that 
their organisations were established or controlled by the government.67 The head of the 
St. Petersburg Security Section noted that they had no idea that these groups existed at 
this time, so they could hardly be considered to have created the URP. Indeed, the 
Minister of the Interior, P.N.Durnovo, naïvely believed at the time that a free democratic 
system envisaged in the October Manifesto would remove the need for any political 
parties.68 Moreover, by the end of 1906 the URP boasted to have one thousand branches 
(one of its leaders would later claim that there was over three times this number) and 
around 300,000 members.69 Such a vast organisation could hardly be considered a 
marionette of the secret police, which, even if we apply a broad definition of its staff, had 
only a few thousand employees. Only a few Department of Police print runs exceeded 
50,000. These pale in comparison to the overall publication activities of the main right-
wing organisations: Purishkevich claimed that the URP published 13 million brochures 
from May to November 1906 alone.70 
Nevertheless, even those who accepted the unpleasant reality of genuine popular 
backing for the URP argued that the intentions of the police in supporting them were anti-
Semitic and part of a determined campaign to sabotage the constitutional experiment. 
However, to view this as a sinister portent of police sponsored proto-fascism fails to take 
into account the specific historical context when these ties were made. In 1905 it had 
become clear that the police organs of state security were not sufficient to subdue mass 
urban demonstrations and uprisings. Police behaviour at the end of 1905 and early 1906 
was determined by the fact that opposition to the tsarist regime was more violent after the 
signing of the October Manifesto. The Special Section (Okhrana HQ) believed that the 
first anniversary of Bloody Sunday would be the spark for yet another, more radical, 
mass uprising, and issued instructions to all branches of the Okhrana that they, ‘invite 
peaceful inhabitants to work with the administration in maintaining order.’71 
Yet, ‘peaceful inhabitants’ who could be relied upon to defend the regime were 
thin on the ground. Whereas the paramilitary druzhiny of the extreme-right had some 
success in matching revolutionary violence with their own brutal methods. It was clear 
even to most conservative officials that these groups, scraped together from the dregs of 
society, were little more than gangs of thugs. But beggars could not be choosers. The 
Assistant Minister of the Interior, Vladimir Gurko, acknowledged as much when he wrote 
that ‘[the regime] was in a precarious position... In normal times no government should 
use methods employed by revolutionists, for in its hands such methods become double-
edged weapons. But during times of revolutionary unrest, when people are in the grip of 
mass-psychosis, the government must support such individual organisations that spring 
up to support it. In 1905 the Union of the Russian People was just such an organisation.’72  
Consequently, the political police only formed truly close connections with the 
extreme-right as a short-term measure after the signing of the October Manifesto. The 
purpose of this alliance was to restore order and to uphold the tsarist regime. As the 
tsarist regime had already made promises of establishing the constitutional order, the 
early alliance with the extreme-right may have also upheld the embryonic constitutional 
experiment. This was not part of a calculated anti-Semitic or anti-democratic campaign, 
but a desperate temporary alliance with the most useful organisations in society at the 
time.73 
It was far from clear how long good relations would last. Stolypin’s closest 
collaborator in the Okhrana, Gerasimov, cautiously monitored the activities of the URP 
as if it were yet another revolutionary party.74 It was for this reason that spies entered the 
URP and other right wing parties up to the February revolution.75 From Okhrana reports 
in St. Petersburg we can see that as early as 1906 Gerasimov had lost faith in the 
reliability and moral qualities of the extreme-right organisations.76 For example, when he 
met with representatives of the URP visiting St. Petersburg for an audience with the tsar 
he was horrified. Gerasimov later wrote that the monk Iliodor, ‘struck me as a fanatic… 
and his comrades were even more vile… uncultured, illiterate people… [Iuskevich-
Kraskovskii in particular, who was clearly] an extremely unintelligent man… with a 
weakness for money.’77 When Dubrovin asked him to provide them with 
accommodation, the head of Petersburg Security Section wryly offered them some of his 
prison cells. 
Most senior police chiefs recognised a basic incompatibility between the police 
and right-wing druzhiny.78 The Okhrana’s prime directive was ‘the preservation of the 
state order and public tranquillity.’79 The police-druzhina honeymoon soon ended when it 
became clear that riots and rowdy public demonstrations– exactly the same things which 
could ruin the career of a security chief– were part and parcel of the URP’s political 
appeal. The druzhiny became an even greater source of irritation when they refused to 
return the revolvers that had been issued to them temporarily for volunteer security work 
on the first anniversary of Bloody Sunday.80  Above all else, this divergence of interests 
was driven by one fundamental aspect of security policing: counter-terror. Gerasimov 
wrote, ‘naturally, as head of a Security Section my specific concern was the struggle with 
terrorism, frustrating their schemes and predicting assassination attempts.’81 Thus, he 
could hardly have welcomed the news in August 1906 that the URP had compiled a list 
of forty three public figures whom they considered to be enemies of the people and who 
ought to be ‘brought to justice,’ i.e. assassinated.82 Top of this list was Sergei Witte. He 
was hated for his role– according to the crude paranoia of URP ideologues– at the 
forefront of a worldwide Jewish-Masonic conspiracy. Certainly the Okhrana appeared to 
take these death threats seriously: teams of bodyguards were sent to protect Witte and 
various liberal politicians such as P.N.Miliukov.83 Evidence of URP terrorist connections 
played a part in Stolypin’s decision to shift government financial support to a new faction 
of the extreme-right, the Union of the Archangel Michael under Purishkevich. This loss 
of favour for the URP exacerbated the split in the organisation in May 1907. So, while 
the Interior Ministry at first helped to build the URP, it later helped to weaken it. The 
condemnation of reactionary terror was genuine but discrete, as indicated by Stolypin’s 
circular to all sections of the Okhrana: ‘One must recognise the service rendered by 
patriotic and monarchist societies throughout the empire. Nevertheless, in this sphere, 
government officials should be very discriminating when coming into contact with 
leaders of these organisations, should impress upon them that the government expects 
absolutely loyal support and rejects any pursuit that involve internecine conflict, terrorist 
undertakings or the like.’84 
In light of this, it is ironic that the main condemnations of government 
inconsistency in tackling terrorism came from the leaders of the Kadet party, when their 
own refusal to condemn left-wing terror hardly helped dismantle the culture of political 
violence.85 True, anti-Semitic police officials greatly exacerbated the situation. But this 
was merely a symptom of a far deeper social malaise. The pogrom was a mass social 
phenomenon. The real causes of anti-Semitic violence were industrialisation, 
urbanisation, migration and concomitant social change. 86  The unpleasant truth was that 
the URP was in a very important sense a ‘party of the people,’ with more supporters than 
the moderate centre parties (three times bigger than, for example, the Kadet party, which 
had at most 100,000 members at this time).87 The liberal movement was reluctant to face 
these issues perhaps because it challenged central articles of their faith concerning the 
civilising effects of economic modernisation and the moderating influence of political 
democracy. Violence escalated as a result of delegating power, in one sense, to the 
‘people.’ 
 
The Herzenstein murder 
All the same, even though the police-Black Hundred honeymoon was over and the 
marriage turned sour, the Interior Ministry and the Okhrana in particular were to 
compromise themselves by failing to bring about a complete divorce from the extreme-
right. On the 18 July 1906 M.Ia.Herzenstein, a Jewish, liberal, former-Duma deputy and 
signatory of the Vyborg Manifesto, was assassinated near Terioki, in Finland, by 
E.S.Larichkin, an agent connected to various right-wing extremist groups including the 
URP. Kadet funded investigations into the murder over the next few years uncovered 
evidence that Dubrovin’s aide, Iuskevich-Kraskovskii, had organised the attack. Their 
crucial witness was a gendarme on duty at Terioki railway station, Captain 
T.A.Zapol’skii.88 He claimed that a group of armed druzhinniki (i.e. members of a right-
wing druzhina) stayed overnight at his home in Terioki before the murder of Herzenstein. 
There was some confusion as to the names of these persons, but most accounts identified 
them as: E.S.Larichkin, A.V.Polovnev (the head of the Putilov druzhina in St. 
Petersburg), Sergei Aleksandrov, Ivan Rudzik, Stepan Ia.Iakovlev (the bona fide Okhrana 
agent) and none other than Aleksandr Kazantsev.89 The gendarme claimed that when he 
challenged the druzhinniki to hand over their guns, Larichkin replied that his had been 
issued by Schlüsselberg police. Moreover, two of the men even produced ‘agent 
identification cards signed by Colonel Gerasimov.’90 
However, these agent identity cards were most likely forgeries. The Department 
of Police were not in the habit of issuing such documentation91 and there is also evidence 
of forged police identification papers circulating at the time which exactly matched the 
description provided by Zapol’skii. 92 All the same, despite Okhrana denials, 93 there is no 
doubt that there was some connection with the police. The druzhinniki also showed 
Zapol’skii a letter of recommendation from the Russian head of the Finnish gendarmerie, 
which he confirmed as genuine.94 And there is also evidence that the police provided 
these individuals with some protection: Captain Zapol’skii met Polovnev by accident in 
St. Petersburg in February 1907 and placed him under arrest, but Polovnev was released 
on the orders of St. Petersburg Security Section.95 This may have been connected to the 
fact that another far more senior okhrannik in Petersburg was involved with this group. 
One witness from the URP claimed that the assistant head of Petersburg Security Section, 
none other than Captain Komissarov, was a member of the Union and that he was known 
in URP circles under the nickname ‘Gamzei Gamzeich.’ This detail is important because 
one member of the Terioki druzhina, whose real identity was never uncovered, also 
travelled under this pseudonym. 96 Vladimir Burtsev also investigated the matter and 
claimed that Komissarov had aided the escape of the two principal culprits, Polovnev and 
Larichkin, who were hidden in Pochaev Monastery.97 Certainly most the culprits seemed 
to escape and disappear very easily, which meant that the very thorough trial in Finland 
(Kivennapa court) took over three years and ensured that the affair was never 
satisfactorily explained.98 All the same, the diligent investigations of liberal lawyers99 at 
the Finnish trial exposed the tangible connections between reactionary terrorists and the 
police. These connections were to have a bearing on the Witte affair.100 
 
Kazantsev’s attempt to blow up the White House 
These investigations also helped Witte piece together the events leading up to the attempt 
on his life. One URP defector revealed that members of the Union first began in St. 
Petersburg in November 1906 to make serious plans for his assassination. Komissarov 
was again said to have been among those present at the discussions.101 Dubrovin 
allegedly commissioned his assistant, Prussakov, to acquire architectural plans of Witte’s 
Petersburg home: no.5 Kamenno-ostrovskii prospekt, known as the ‘White House.’ The 
responsibility for carrying out this assassination evidently passed to one member of the 
Terioki druzhina, Aleksandr Kazantsev: he returned from Petersburg to Moscow with a 
large amount of money in November 1906 and began recruiting accomplices.102  
The choice of Kazantsev to carry out the murder was probably based on three 
factors: firstly, as a participant in the Herzenstein murder, he was an experienced 
terrorist. Secondly, he was well connected with officials in Moscow: according to his 
mistress he worked for the Moscow Governor General, S.K.Gershel’man, as ‘Chief 
Controller over the Investigative Police’ (Glavnyi kontroler nad sysknoi politsiei) 
subordinated to Gershel’man’s assistant, Count A.A.Buxhoeveden.103 The generous 
salary that he gave Kazantsev strongly indicates that Buxhoeveden was the ringleader in 
the plot.104 The attack was probably organised in Moscow in order to distract attention 
away from the Petersburg members of the extreme-right who were already under 
investigation for connections to the Herzenstein murder. Finally, an accident perhaps had 
the decisive influence on the unfolding conspiracy: While in Petersburg in November 
1906 Kazantsev happened to bump into an old friend, Semen Dem’ianovich Petrov.  
Why was this significant? They had worked together for three years in the 
Tilmans factory in St Petersburg. Petrov had no idea about Kazantsev’s sudden political 
conversion to the extreme-right. Kazantsev had good reason not to enlighten him on this 
matter: Petrov was well connected to the revolutionary underground. He was a member 
of the Marxist Social Democratic party and had served as a deputy in the short-lived 
Petersburg Soviet of 1905. As such, he had reason to hate Witte: he had been arrested and 
exiled in December 1905 at the Prime Minister’s behest. This chance meeting therefore 
provided Kazantsev with the opportunity for a far more subtle terrorist plot. Through 
Petrov Kazantsev could recruit left-wingers to carry out the right-wing scheme and 
thereby further camouflage the real organisers. All he needed to do was be a little 
economical with the truth. Thus, Kazantsev boasted to Petrov that he had joined the 
Maximalist wing of the SR party and that they were planning the murder of former-Prime 
Minister Sergei Witte. Petrov took the bait and offered his services. He also introduced 
Kazantsev to a left-winger in his early twenties willing to go to extreme lengths to 
impress the legendary Maximalists: V.D.Fedorov.105 From his later behaviour it seems 
that Fedorov was gullible and a borderline psychopath: in other words, ideal for the task 
in hand. Ironically, these very same attributes were to prove Kazantsev’s undoing.  
Meanwhile, undaunted by anonymous death threats, Witte returned to Russia in 
autumn 1906. St. Petersburg Security Section assigned him round the clock security. This 
appears to have been ineffective as on the evening of 29 January 1907 a servant in the 
White House discovered a heavy rectangular package in the stove of Witte’s daughter’s 
old bedroom. Witte immediately contacted St. Petersburg Security Section. The section’s 
resident explosives expert, a former artillery officer, M.S.Komissarov again, was the first 
to arrive at the scene of the crime. He took the parcel into the garden and identified it as a 
time-bomb, which had been set to explode at nine o’clock. Seeing as it was past ten 
o’clock in the evening it was clear that the timer had failed to detonate the bomb and it 
was simple enough to disarm the device. ‘A swarm of other police and judicial 
personnel,’106 soon arrived at Witte’s house that same evening including the two most 
senior Okhrana officers, M.I.Trusevich and A.V.Gerasimov. To Witte’s great annoyance 
this intrusive and inquisitive gathering of okhranniki did not appear to take the attack 
seriously. ‘This was not a bomb,’ Gerasimov derisively recollected, ‘it was a child’s 
toy.’107 Nonplussed as to who would want to kill Witte, certain officials mockingly 
suggested that the former-Prime Minister had placed the bomb there himself in a feeble 
attempt to enhance his popularity.108 
To add potential injury to insult, Witte discovered that the police had not properly 
searched the house. A second bomb lodged half-way down the kitchen chimney pipe was 
only discovered the next day when he had the tsar’s palace chimney sweeps check again. 
Press reports six months later were to reveal that these parcels had been dropped down 
the chimneys at six a.m. on 29 January by Fedorov and a certain A.S.Stepanov. Petrov, 
the original left-wing dupe, had not been able to take part in the attack because he was 
arrested when the group reached St. Petersburg. Stepanov, an acquaintance of Fedorov, 
took Petrov’s place at the last minute, believing that he was working for anarchists. 109  
The time-bombs had been supplied by Kazantsev, who had also generously treated 
Fedorov and Stepanov to an all-night drinking session, ensuring that the two men were 
well and truly inebriated when they carried out the mission. Kazantsev then watched the 
house into the afternoon waiting for the bombs to explode. When it became clear that the 
timers had failed Kazantsev sent the two men back to the house the next day to throw 
heavy objects down the chimney in order to instantly trigger the devices! However, they 
were not able to complete the suicide mission because the house was already surrounded 
by police.  
It soon became clear to Witte that this was no ordinary terrorist attack. The bombs 
contained a rare, very powerful explosive material not usually used by revolutionaries. A 
former-URP member, Valerian Kazarinov, later confessed to assembling the devices for 
Kazantsev.110 Numerous and somewhat contradictory accusations circulated that 
Kazarinov had obtained the explosives from agents of either Petersburg or Moscow 
Security Section.111 In the week following the attempt on his life Witte received two 
threatening letters, both demanding 5000 rubles or the attack would be repeated. He 
passed both letters to the Okhrana in Petersburg. Both letters disappeared. There is little 
doubt that they were written by Kazantsev, who appeared to be concerned that he was not 
going to be paid for the botched terrorist attack and sought payment by other means. His 
venality was further corroborated by Dr. Dubrovin’s, secretary A.I.Prussakov, who later 
testified that two young men, posing as revolutionaries, appeared in Dubrovin’s office a 
few days after the attack, demanding 5000 rubles or they would tell Count Witte that the 
URP had instigated the plot.112 One of the men was almost certainly Kazantsev– judging 
by his increased wealth in early 1907. The fact that the two men claimed to be 
revolutionaries indicates that the other was probably Fedorov or Stepanov (Kazantsev 
had to maintain the charade but knew that Dubrovin would not want the truth to come 
out). Early in 1909 the official judicial investigator, P.Aleksandrov, supplied Witte with a 
photographic copy of a letter he had found in the staff files of the City Governor: it was 
one of the two missing notes. Aleksandrov claimed he had found it in the City 
Governor’s files on members of staff at St. Petersburg Security Section under the letter 
‘K’ and labelled ‘Kazantsev.’113 
Kazantsev’s later movements provided further evidence of close connections to 
police staff. The sister of his mistress said Kazantsev often boasted that he worked for 
Moscow Security Section. Various witnesses noted that by spring 1907 he was a man to 
whom ordinary police ‘tipped their hats.’ Kazantsev rented a flat in February 1907 under 
an assumed name, ‘Kazimir Oleiko’. The only form of identification later to be found on 
Kazantsev’s corpse at the end of May was a passport bearing the same name. The real 
Kazimir Oleiko had lost this passport in April 1906 and was issued with a new one. The 
old one was found and filed away in the archives of Moscow Security Section in June 
1906. The head of the section investigated the matter and concluded that the passport had 
been stolen by one of two volunteer clerks.114 They may well have been only convenient 
scapegoats on behalf of more senior police officials, because both had already been 
dismissed on a different matter. Kazantsev made a visit to Petersburg in March 1907. 
While there he passed on information to the Okhrana which resulted in the seizure of an 
underground revolutionary cell and a cache of bombs in the capital. Nevertheless, the 
Okhrana denied any direct dealings with Kazantsev in this matter. The tip-off had 
apparently passed through a complex route– from Kazantsev to Buxhoeveden, then to 
Klimovich and from him to Petersburg Security Section. This was a very typical example 
of how police conspiratorial measures were used to distance their connections with 
criminals through a disorientating maze of delegation, middlemen, buffers and secrecy. 
Obfuscation prevailed. 
Kazantsev used his newfound wealth to start up his own business in April 1907 as 
a blacksmith with the ‘anarchist’ Stepanov as his apprentice. He gave free lodgings and 
new coats to Fedorov and Stepanov. 115 But his generosity came at a price: plans were 
being made for another attempt on the life of Sergei Witte. First of all he told Fedorov 
that he could redeem himself in the eyes of the Maximalists if he were to carry out the 
execution of a banker who had embezzled SR party funds of 80,000 rubles. The target 
was in reality G.B.Iollos, a former Kadet deputy, signatory of the Vyborg Manifesto and 
a leading Moscow journalist exposing the URP’s connections with the Herzenstein 
murder. Armed with a browning supplied by Kazantsev, Fedorov followed Iollos on the 
evening of 14 March 1907 and shot him four times in the head. The head of the volunteer 
okhrana in Moscow provided a hideout for Kazantsev and Fedorov after the murder.116 
Fedorov only discovered whom it was he had actually killed when he read the news in the 
Moscow press.117  
Yet still he didn’t guess that he was not working for the SRs and agreed to go 
ahead with the second attempt on Witte’s life. Kazantsev had devised a new plan: 
Fedorov and one other person were to throw bombs into Witte’s motor car when he made 
his way to the State Council on 26 May 1907. Fedorov’s partner in crime was to be the 
Social Demcrat, Petrov.  
Kazantsev had written to Petrov, who had been exiled to Archangel after his 
arrest, and invited him to Moscow in early May. His escape was easy enough (he was 
suffering from syphilis and being held with minimum supervision in a hospital). 
Kazantsev provided Petrov with a place to stay in Moscow and a blank passport. 
However, Petrov was a rather more experienced conspirator than Fedorov and he soon 
grew suspicious of Kazantsev, particularly after he found collection of URP leaflets lying 
in an open desk drawer in Kazantsev’s apartment. Upon arriving in St. Petersburg on 25 
May 1907 Petrov presented all he knew to some leftist Duma deputies of his 
acquaintance.118 They confirmed that Kazantsev was not an SR Maximalist, but that 
Petrov should play along with Kazantsev in order to capture his store of explosives. As a 
further precaution, these socialist Duma deputies made sure members of the State 
Council were warned about the imminent attack. Consequently, the State Council 
meeting of 26 May was cancelled.119 But they had not completely defused the situation 
because Petrov had also informed the accomplished murderer Fedorov about his 
suspicions. Kazantsev and Fedorov met in a forest on the outskirts of Petersburg on 27 
May, in order to assemble the bombs for the second attack on Witte at the rescheduled 
meeting of the State Council on 30 May.120 While Kazantsev knelt on the ground 
preparing the bomb, Fedorov pounced and stabbed his unsuspecting victim in the neck. 
Thinking Kazantsev dead, he then began to search his body. However, the ‘corpse’ began 
to stir and, as one newspaper paraphrased his own confession, ‘Fedorov completely lost 
control and began to stab him in the face- forgetting to take the knife from its sheath… he 
stabbed Kazantsev so forcefully in the neck that the head nearly separated from the 
body.’121 
The victim of this gruesome murder was found a few hours later. The only means 
of identification on the corpse was the stolen passport and a notebook. Kazatnsev’s 
anonymity in death gave Fedorov ample time to flee the country. But Fedorov had 
acquired a taste for violence and the concomitant publicity. Thus, Kazantsev’s identity 
was soon uncovered because Fedorov sold his story to the ‘Sherlock Holmes of the 
revolutionary movement’, Vladimir Burtsev, in June 1907.122 In August 1907 the 
Okhrana reported that Fedorov was involved in an attempt on the life of the Finnish 
Governor-General, Zein. In October 1910 Fedorov met Burtsev in Paris to demand 
money owed for his revelations. Okhrana spies reported that at the final meeting Fedorov 
was drunk, lost his temper and tried to strangle Burtsev.123 Fedorov was sent to a French 
prison in 1912 for assault on another person.124 The outrageous actions of Fedorov served 
the opposition well: the Okhrana had yet another scandal on its hands. In May 1909 a 
Duma interpellation alleged police and URP connections to the Herzenstein, Iollos and 
Witte attacks.125 
 
Further on and higher up: Conspiracy, conflict and confusion 
In much the same manner as the Komissarov affair, liberal factions used revelations of 
police terror as a means of bringing all opposition groups together united against an 
apparently omnipotent secret police. Yet these revelations were dependent on leaks from 
inside the Department of Police.126 Thus, once again it was internecine war among 
government officials, not a state-society confrontation, which truly fuelled the scandal. 
Okhrana reports noted that the principal source alleging long-standing police directed 
terror was Witte himself.127 Ex-Okhrana agent Manuilov carried out investigations on 
Witte’s behalf, infecting the former-Prime Minister with his own delusions of police 
persecution.128 Most leading okhranniki were all too eager to delve into the sordid affair 
if it meant they could uncover compromising evidence against their opponents inside the 
police.129 Petersburg Okhrana interrogated Petrov after his arrest in Tashkent on 23 
August 1907 and were disappointed to note he could shed no new light on the affair, 
giving an, ‘evasive and muddled testimony.’130 The French government, not internal 
conspiracy, blocked Stolypin’s attempts to have Fedorov extradited from Paris.131 
Gerasimov was the first to suggest to Witte that the attack had come from the extreme-
right. He did so, partly in order to discredit the pre-eminent druzhinnik, Iuskevich-
Kraskovskii, who had been forwarded as a potential replacement for Gerasimov as head 
of Petersburg Security Section.132 Gerasimov was also motivated by a desire to blacken 
the reputations of his rivals inside the Okhrana.133 He claimed: ‘there was no doubt in my 
mind, that the dynamite was received from Moscow Security Section and that the whole 
attempt [on Witte’s life] was organised with the knowledge of the head of the Section, 
Colonel Klimovich. I wrote all this in a report to the Department of Police – where it was 
buried.’134 
Gerasimov had good reason to make these accusations: Kazantsev’s notebook 
contained references to a certain “Bel’skii”, who was referred to several times as 
Ostorozhnyi (‘Cautious’). This tallied with Fedorov and Petrov’s statement that their next 
target was to be a certain Dr. Bel’skii.135 The use of the codename Ostorozhnyi 
compromised Moscow Security Section because it was a secret codename used for him 
by Okhrana surveillance agents in Moscow.136 Moreover, the Moscow City Governor 
Reinbot later claimed Klimovich confessed to him that he had personally provided 
Kazantsev with the stolen passports.137 Klimovich put Kazantsev on the secret agent 
blacklist in February 1909 (thus implying that Kazantsev had been at one time a secret 
agent).138 Klimovich’s report made no mention of the fact that Kazantsev, having been 
dead for two years, was not likely to be offering his services in the near future! 
Curiously, Gerasimov’s memoirs contain not one word about his own assistant at 
Petersburg Security Section, Captain Komissarov. This was perhaps due to the awkward 
fact that Komissarov had married Gerasimov’s ex-wife.139 The threads of evidence are 
thin and insubstantial, but they keep leading us back to Komissarov. He was a close 
friend of the chief suspect, Klimovich. They were part of a tight circle of gendarmes who 
had attended Polotsk cadet school together and co-operated on numerous occasions.140 As 
Rachkovskii’s protégé Komissarov had been the Okhrana’s chief intermediary with the 
URP,141 he bore a grudge against Witte, and numerous witnesses connected him to the 
Herzenstein and Witte attacks. Komissarov’s later career also serves as a damning 
character witness. He was reputed to have organised pogroms in 1909 and 1911.142 He 
was later implicated in an early attempt to rid the court of another ‘meddlesome priest’, 
Grigorii Rasputin, in 1916. According to gossip he tried to poison Rasputin with a 
compound obtained from his wife’s apothecary, but only succeeded in killing his cat, 
earning him the ironic nickname ‘Maliuta Skuratov’.143 Komissarov embodied all that 
was bad about the Okhrana – for his anti-Semitism, unscrupulous court intrigues, sinister 
connections with terrorism and gangster-style policing methods.144 He even represents 
one of the few tangible connections between the Okhrana and the Soviet secret police, as 
it was rumoured that he went on to work for the Cheka145 and the OGPU.146  
But, even after the compilation of strong evidence against Okhrana staff and 
members of the URP, no arrests took place in connection with the Witte attack. When 
Witte asked why not, the St Petersburg district prosecutor, Kamyshanskii, replied: ‘If we 
only arrested these persons, and carried out investigations into them we don’t know what 
we might find, it would probably lead us further on and higher up.’147  
Witte interpreted Kamyshanskii’s lament as the dark suggestion of a widespread 
police conspiracy to murder him. After three years of investigations Witte delivered a 
careful 37 page-long anatomy of his case to his successor, Stolypin, in an effort to 
provoke a senatorial enquiry into the affair.148 In this letter he picked up on one seemingly 
trivial detail which he believed to be central to the second murderous conspiracy of May 
1907: Why did Kazantsev invite Petrov from exile back to Moscow? ‘Why did Kazantsev 
need Semen Petrov? Why not take Aleksei Stepanov with him to St Petersburg?’ In 
answer to his own question he wrote: ‘[Because] the conspiracy was directed not against 
Count Witte personally but against the left-wing political parties in general…Stepanov 
had no sort of revolutionary views, he was in it for the money… Semen Petrov on the 
other hand was a member of the Soviet of Workers Deputies and, as such, was arrested 
on my orders. The murder, therefore, would be a party political matter… Public opinion 
has grown all too accustomed to the murder of not just gendarmes and policemen, but 
also senior government officials.’  Whereas the murder of the symbolic founder of the 
constitutional experiment, he claimed, would cause a ‘sensation’, particularly among the 
liberal parties who had refused to condemn revolutionary terror in the past. It would 
‘arouse the indignation of society against the left-wing political parties. This would 
perhaps lead to calls for the government to take more energetic measures in the struggle 
with them… on the eve of the dissolution of the second Duma and the publication of the 
June third laws.’149 
So who would benefit most from this conspiracy? Witte pointed to the fact that 
there would be inevitable suspicion of right-wing involvement, and discrediting the ‘cult 
of murder’ would affect the right-wing druzhiny also. Yet he avoided following his line 
of argument to its logical conclusion. If the attack was part of a deliberate and subtle 
conspiracy, who would have benefited most from a reaction against the left at the time of 
the dissolution of the Second Duma? And who would benefit from a general government 
and social reaction against left and right-wing political terror? None other than the man 
who had used police provocation to bring about of the June third coup just one month 
after the last plot to murder Witte, the leading counter-terrorist security police official, 
Minister of the Interior and Chairman of the Council of Ministers: P.A.Stolypin. Stolypin 
grasped these implications, even if Witte did not. In response he accosted Witte after a 
meeting of the State Council: ‘From your letter Count I can only draw one conclusion: 
either you consider me an idiot or you think that I too was involved in the attempt on 
your life.’150 Rather than soothing Stolypin’s anger, Witte impishly demurred from 
offering any suggestion as to which conclusion the Minister of the Interior should choose. 
Witte’s conspiracy theory could be sustained only by rejecting all elements of 
inconsistency, coincidence, and accident in the case. As such, it was symptomatic of the 
‘interpretative paranoia’151 that had infected, to varying degrees, each and every 
ideological cell of the body politic in imperial Russia. Anti-Semites, court intriguers, 
dogmatic revolutionary theorists, feuding bureaucratic cliques and liberal muckrakers 
shared a similar blinkered inclination to interpret all events as confirming preconceived 
beliefs. This was the bedrock of what Miliukov referred to as the ‘maximalist’ tendency 
in Russian politics.152 Interpretative paranoia was all the more prevalent in the secret 
police owing to the overload of information and conspiratorial Weltenschauung. 153 Thus, 
the police were often the firmest believers in the myth of the Okhrana’s terrorist 
conspiracies.154 Gerasimov was perhaps imperial Russia’s most successful counter-
terrorist officer; yet his prolonged submersion in the terrorist milieu also led to rumours, 
based on the flimsiest of evidence, that he resorted to terrorism to remove his political 
opponents.155 Far from covering this up, a cabal of his personal enemies in the Okhrana 
(Kurlov, Klimovich and possibly Komissarov) exaggerated the rumours so as to secure 
his removal.156 Kurlov may well have made an oblique reference to Gerasimov’s guilt in 
his memoirs when he wrote ‘I can confirm that I never indulged in provocation, but 
[certain unnamed persons] made attempts at the beginning of my service as a senior 
director of investigations [i.e. in 1909] resulted in the retirement of the guilty parties.’157 
Gerasimov, the senior-most Okhrana operative, was forced into retirement at exactly this 
time. Some police officials had even suspected Witte of plotting to use the Okhrana as an 
assassination bureau.158 
The Okhrana succumbed to interpretative paranoia for the same reason that it was 
suspected of orchestrating reactionary terror: Political life was a seamless and tangled 
web. Naturally, the political police were also tangled in the web. Of course the Okhrana 
had connections to right-wing terror; but it also had connections to the trade union 
movement, the Duma, the free press, revolutionary terror, freemasonry etc. etc.159 If every 
rival conspiracy theory was to be taken into account then we could draw the conclusion 
that almost every political faction was responsible in some way for the attempt on Witte’s 
life. While in a literal sense this was nonsense, from a moral point of view perhaps this 
was not so far from the truth. All political groups were to varying degrees complicit in 
acts of terror. 
The real meaning Kamyshanskii’s phrase ‘further on and higher up’, therefore, 
was far more prosaic, and yet also indicative of a far deeper malaise. Klimovich’s 
connection to Kazantsev’s terrorist plot was an unfortunate coincidence due the fact that 
Kazantsev worked for Count Buxhoeveden and the Moscow volunteer okhrana.160 
Buxhoeveden in turn belonged to a piaterka of volunteer security police under Ministry 
of Imperial Courts kontroller, D.F.Gofshtetter.161 Klimovich claimed that he was advised 
not to ‘push away’ the right-wing druzhiny because they were ‘under the protection’ of 
the Moscow Governors Reinbot and Gershel’man.162 The same applied in Petersburg163 
and in sections of the Orthodox Church. 164 Worst of all, the tsar’s sympathy towards the 
URP, his hostility to Witte and lack of enthusiasm for investigations into the 
assassination attempt were all common knowledge.165 Komissarov’s disreputable career 
flourished because his behaviour changed with the prevailing political climate. At that 
time, he noted, ‘Russia was an absolute monarchy. What the tsar willed not, was not: 
what he wished, subordinates outdid themselves to fulfil.’166 If Komissarov took part in 
terrorist attacks from 1906 to 1907, then he probably took his cues, but not any direct 
orders, from the imperial court. The guilty parties in the Witte affair disappeared amidst 
the guilty crowd. Even now, they are concealed by the plethora, not the paucity, of 
incriminating evidence. 
 
                                                
1 I have used three versions of Witte’s account: S.Iu.Witte, Memoirs, trans. Sidney Harcave (New York, 
1990) [hereafter: Witte, Memoirs). idem, Vospominaniia (3 vols. Moscow, 1960) vol.III, chpt.67, pp.414-
440. [Hereafter: Vospominaniia]; Witte’s official letter to Stolypin, dated 3 May 1910: Gosudarstvennyi 
Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow [GARF] f.102, op.295 (1910g.) d.125 ‘Zaiavlenie Grafa Vitte s 
materialom po povodu podgotovlenie pokusheniia na nego.’ ll.3-21. Where not otherwise mentioned the 
narrative of the assassination attempts comes from these sources. Also useful were Pavl Aleksandrov’s 
official judicial reports: Ibid., ll.23-26, 1 Feb.1910; & ibid., ll.27-53 ob., 25 May 1910. 
2 Le Matin, ‘Terroristes et Cents-Noires,’ 29 April 1909.  
3 Znamia truda, 19 June 1907. Kazantsev’s patronymic was given alternately as Ivanovich or Eremeev. 
4 The story was first picked up by the liberal press in Rech’, 20 & 28 June 1907. 
5 Le Matin, ‘Terroristes et Cents-Noires,’ 29 April 1909. 
6 GARF, f.102, op.238, d.511, ll.122-23 Moscow Security Section [Moscow OO] to Department of Police 
Special Section [Hereafter DPOO], 8 July 1907. P.E.Shchegolev (ed.), Padenie tsarskogo rezhima 
[hereafter PTsR] (7 vols., Leningrad, 1924-27), vol.VI, Dopros A.A.Reinbota, p.122; A.V.Gerasimov, Na 
lezvii s terroristami (Paris, 1985), p.153. 
7 Witte, Vospominaniia, p.432. Witte uses the term ‘Okhrannoe otdelenie’ to refer to the organs of the 
secret political security police in general. 
8 Vladimir Burtsev in Budushchee, no.4, 12 Nov. 1911. 
9 A.A.Lopukhin, Iz itogov sluzhebnogo opyta: Nastoiashchee i budushchee russkoi politsii (Moscow, 
1907), pp.32-33. His argument was adopted most notably by Richard Pipes in Russia Under the Old regime 
(London, 1974), p.316. See also: V.M.Gessen, Isklyuchitel’noe polozhenie (St Petersburg, 1908), p.171. 
10 See N.A.Geredskul, Terror i Okhrana (St Petersburg, 1912), passim. 
11 A.I.Guchkov, in the Duma 11 Nov.1911: Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Stenograficheskie otchety [Herafter: 
GDSO] (St.Petersburg, 1911), 3rd Duma, 5th Session, vol.I, col.2065. 
12 Qutd in Stepanov, Zagadki, p.160. 
13 GARF f.271, op.1, d.24, ll. 8-9, Vsepoddanneishii doklad Senatora Trusevicha: Published in full in 
S.A.Stepanov, Zagadki ubiistva Stolypina (Moscow 1993). See also: B.Yu.Maiskii, ‘Stolypinshchina i 
konets Stolypina,’ Voprosy istorii, no.2 (1966), pp.129-35.  
14 V.V.Shul’gin, Gody- dni- 1920 (reprint: Novosti, Moscow, 1990), p.129. 
15 Daniel Orlovsky, ‘Political Clientelism in Russia: The Historical Perspective,’ in T.H.Rigby and Bohdan 
Harasymiw (eds.), Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugolslavia 
(London, 1983), part 2 chapter 5. See also Steffen Schmidt, James C.Scott, Carl Lande & Laura Guasti 
(eds.), Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism (Berkeley, 1978).  
                                                                                                                                            
16 I.V.Stalin to the plenum of the central committee, Feb./March 1937 qutd. in C.H.Fairbanks Jr., 
‘Clientelism and Higher Politics in Georgia, 1949-53,’ in R.G.Suny (ed.), Transcaucasia. Nationalism and 
Social Change (Ann Arbor, 1983), p.342. See I.V.Stalin, Sochineniia, ed. R.H.McNeal (Stanford, 1967), 
pp.230-31. 
17 See: Golos minuvshago, no.1/3 Jan/March 1918 pp.139-83 & ibid., Jan-June 1916 articles by 
V.N.Smel’skii (diary of a member). P.A.Sadikov, ‘Obshchestvo “Sviashchennoi druzhiny,” (“Otchetnaia 
zapiska” 1881-1882 gg.),’ Krasnyi arkhiv, vol.XXI (1927), pp.200-17. 
18 On size and composition see: Sadikov, ‘Obshchestvo’ pp.200-03 & 206. 
19 K.A.Borodzin, ‘Sviashchennaia druzhina i narodnaia volia,’ Byloe, no.10 (1907), pp.123-67. 
20 P.P.Shuvalov published Vol’noe slovo-(posing as a zemstvo publication) edited by Mal’shinskii. Pravda 
posed as a fiery People’s Will journal (edited by a protégé of Sudeikin, Klimov). 
21 B.Anan’ich and R.Sh.Ganelin, Sergei Iulevich Vitte i ego vremia (St Petersburg, 1999), pp.27-31. 
Various other publications on the Brotherhood came from M.K.Lemke (Petrograd 1920-21), 
S.P.Mel’gunov (1918). 
22 A.V.Rumanov, ‘Sviashchennaia druzhina,’ Russkoe slovo, 20 June 1913; & idem.,‘”Liga spaseniia 
Rossii” i P.I.Rachkovskii,’ Russkoe slovo, 21 July 1913. 
23 On finance from the Court Ministry see: Sadikov, ‘Obshchestvo,’ pp.200-03 & 206. 
24 P.Statkovskii, ‘Departament politsii v 1892-1908 gg. (Iz vospominanii chinovnika),’ Byloe nos.5-6, 
(Nov./Dec. 1917), p.17. 
25 Qutd. in S.Lukashevich, ‘The Holy Brotherhood, 1881-83,’ American Slavic and East European Review 
18 (Dec.1959), p.505. See Gerasimov, Na lezvii, p.150. 
26 E.g. A.S.Skandrakov (head of Moscow Okhrana), the Ministers of the Interior, Ignat’ev and Count 
Tolstoi, and the Director of DP, V.K.Plehve. See Russkaia molva, 5 May 1913, ‘Iz del davno minuvshikh 
dnei.’- written by L.P.Men’shchikov under the pseudonym Hez. 
27 A.S.Suvorin, Dnevnik (Moscow, 1992), diary entry 28 Feb.1893, p.27. 
28 Witte, Memoirs, ch.8, p.68. Witte’s role made public in the fat journals in 1913 (Russkaia mysl’, 
Sovremennik, Vestnik Evropy etc.) O.O.Gruzenberg, Vchera: Vospominaniia (Paris, 1938), p.130. 
29 See: Iain Lauchlan, ‘Separate Realm? The Okhrana Myth and Imperial Russian Otherness,’ in Russian 
Imperial Identity, eds. Chris Chulos, et al. (Helsinki, 2001).  
30 Witte, Memoirs, p.518. 
31 Ibid., p.506. 
32 “Kar’era  P.I.Rachkovskogo: dokumenty,” Byloe, no.2/30 (Feb.1918), p.80. This is based on a dossier 
compiled by MVD Plehve dated 13 July 1903 and adapted by P.N.Durnovo in a note to the tsar. 
33  Lopukhin statement to the Provisional Government: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 
Nicolaevskii collection, Box 205, folder ‘chrevychainaia’, p.7. L.P.Menshchikov, Okhrana i revoliutsiia, 
(Moscow, 1932) vol.3, p.75, V.S.Brachev, ‘Master poiticheskogo syska Petr Ivanovich Rachkovskii,’ 
Ezhegodnik (Sankt Peterburgskoe nauchno obshchestvo istorikov, RGIA, 1996), p.298. See also former 
police official, Bakai’s assertion that Rachkovskii used Azef to accomplish terrorist attacks: ‘Iz zapisok 
M.E.Bakaia. Azef, Stolypin i provokatsiia,’ p.205. 
34 Rachkovskii’s closest collaborators were Jewish: most notable his secretary Gol’shman and his leading 
spies, Landezen-Harting and Evno Azef. See: P.E.Shchegolev, Okhranniki, agenty, palachi (Reprint: 
Moscow, 1992), p.200. V.K.Agafanov, Zagranichnaia okhranka (Petrograd, 1918), pp.61-62. 
35 See: Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide (London, 1970), p.85. The main evidence came from Henri 
Bint, who later entered the service of the Soviets, therefore hardly a reliable witness: GARF, f.509, ‘Bint 
Genri (1853-1929), Nabliudatel’nyi agent, op.1, dd.1-30. For the most thorough analysis of the origins of 
the Protocols, see: C.Ruud & S.Stepanov, Fontanka 16 (London, 1999), chpt.10.  
36 Gerasimov, Na lezvii, p.149. 
37 E.H.Judge, Plehve: Repression and Reform in Imperial Russia, 1902-1904 (New York, 1983), p.136. 
38 On Witte’s close relations with Manuilov dating back to meeting in Paris around 1903 see Witte, 
Memoirs, p.362 & p.557. Shchegolev, Okhranniki, pp.186-87 & 207-08: Manuilov wrote right-wing 
articles in the Parisian press. Oddly enough, it was rumoured that Witte had lost his job as Minister of 
Finance due to the theft of compromising documents by Manuilov on behalf of Plehve. Witte was 
supposedly related to Manuilov by marriage: Anan’ich & Ganelin, Vitte, p.299.  
                                                                                                                                            
39 For Manuilov’s letter 31 Oct. 1905  to Zubatov attempting to recruit his services for Wiite see:  
B.Kozmin (ed.), Zubatov i ego korrespondenty, pp.106-07; P.Statkovskii, ‘Departament politsii,’ p.21. 
40 A.A.Lopukhin, Otryvki iz vospominanii po povodu “Vospominaniia” S.Iu. Witte (Moscow, 1923), pp.81-
89: Lopukhin, previously a client of the late V.K.Plehve, was sharply critical of many of Witte’s views and 
policies.  
41 V.I.Gurko, Features and Figures of the Past of the Past (trans. Laura Matveev, London, 1939), p.455; 
Mark Aldanov, ‘P.N.Durnovo- Prophet of War and Revolution,’ Russian Review, vol.2 (1942), p.42. 
42 Hoover, Nikolaevskii Collection, Box 205, folder ‘Letter to Stolypin,’ 14 June 1906, pp.1-5. Witte, 
Memoirs, pp.515-17.  
43 S.A.Stepanov, Chernaia sotnia v Rossii (1905-1914 gg.), pp.56-57. An estimated 690 anti-Semitic riots 
(pogroms) leading to 3,000 deaths in the first two weeks after the October manifesto alone. The most 
violent outbreaks, involving thousands of deaths, occurred in Odessa in October 1905, Gomel in Jan.1906, 
Aleksandrovsk in Feb.1906, Belostok in June 1906 and Elizavetgrad in Feb.1907. 
44 Quoted in review of, A.Tsitron, ‘72 dnia pervogo russkago parlamenta,’ in Byloe, no.11 (St. Petersburg, 
Nov. 1906), p.319. 
45 Witte, Memoirs, p.517.On the wording of these proclamations see: Shlomo Lambroza, ‘The Pogroms of 
1903-1906,’ in John Klier & S.Lambroza (eds.), Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian 
History (London, 1992), p.205. 
46 S.E.Kryzhanovskii, Vospominaniia (Berlin, 1938), pp.100-03; Lopukhin, Otryvki p.89; Statkovskii, 
‘Departament politsii,’ pp.21-22 
47 Hoover, Nicolaevskii, Box 205, folder ‘Letter to Stolypin,’ 14 June 1906. This letter is principally aimed 
at removing the influence of Rachkovskii. On Durnovo’s defence of Komissarov see: Rossiiskii 
Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv, St.Petersburg (RGIA), f.1622, op.1, d.311, letters 2 - 22 March. 
Komissarov owed his appointment to the DP to Plehve, The New York Times [hereafter NYT], 2 Nov. 
1924, no.2, section VIII, p.6, cols.3-5. 
48 D.C.Rawson, Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905 (Cambridge, 1995), pp.137-39. On Lopukhin 
see: E.P.Mednikov to Zubatov 26 Aug.1906 in Koz’min , Zubatov, p.123; & C.A.Ruud, ‘Police 
Insubordination and the Rule of Law,’ Russian History, vol.20 (1993), pp.153-54. On Urusov see: 
S.D.Urusov, Memoirs of a Russian Governor (London, 1908). 
49 M.G.Fleer, ‘Revoliutsiia 1905-1906 gg. v doneseniiakh inostrannykh diplomatov,’ Krasnyi arkhiv, vol.3 
[16] (1926), pp.220-24. This documentary evidence shows that Komissarov obtained the ciphers of twelve 
governments and produced 68 detailed reports (doklady) from January to June 1906 alone. PTsR, vol.III, 
Dopros Komissarova, p.141. See: Christopher Andrew and Keith Neilson, ‘Tsarist Codebreakers and 
British Codes,’ Intelligence and National Security, vol.1 (1986), pp.6-12. On Manuilov’s rather less 
successful efforts in the Hague see: Shchegolev, Okhranniki, pp.180, 186-88 & 196. His intelligence was 
mostly tit-bits culled from the French police, other ‘secret documents’ included press cuttings from 
Japanese newspapers and photographs of pages from a Chinese dictionary! 
50N.A.Makarov was the leak. He had been the head of the Special Section (the Okhrana HQ),  The 
gendarme was a Captain Budogovskii. Rech’, 3 May 1906: N.A.Makarov was dismissed by Durnovo for 
airing these grievances in Jan. 1906. 
51 Duma speech, 8 May 1906, quoted in Tsitron review in Byloe, no.11, pp.317-18. See also: ‘Pervaia 
gosudarstvennaia duma,’ Byloe no.2 (Feb.1907) pp.17-19; & GDSO, First Duma, vol.2, zas[edanie] 
{sitting} 23, 8 June 1906,col[umn] 1129. Kryzhanovskii, Vospominaniia, pp.100-01. 
52 GDSO, First Duma, vol.2, zas.20, 2 June 1906, cols.952-60. The Kadet deputy Rodichev made similar 
accusations that the pogroms had been ‘organised by the Department of Police.’  
53 NYT, 2 Nov. 1924, VIII, p.6, cols.vii-viii. He named the allies as: M.I.Gurovich, E.P.Mednikov and 
N.A.Makarov. 
54 Komissarov didn’t even name Rachkovskii as one of the culprits: PTsR, vol.III, Dopros Komissarova, 
pp158-60. On Rachkovskii’s enemies holding him to blame see: Koz’min, Zubatov, p.118; & Rech’ 3 May 
1906. O.O.Gruzenberg in Rech’ 13 Oct. 1906 (no.189) claimed Vuich, the Director DP, had approved 
Komissarov’s pogrom proclamations. 
55 NYT, 2 Nov. 1924, VIII, 6, viii. 
56 Hoover, Nikolaevskii Collection, Box 205, folder ‘Letter to Stolypin,’ 
                                                                                                                                            
57 Witte also used this tactic prior to the Komissarov affair. For example, he encouraged rumours in the 
foreign press in 1905 that Gorky was an anti-Semite: O.Figes, A People’s Tragedy (London, 1996), p.202. 
58 Shchegolev, Okhranniki, p.198. 
59 Ibid., pp.202-06 & 209. In fact Komissarov had left StPetersburg Security Section [hereafter: StPbOO] at 
this time and the arrest appeared to be justified: Kurlov search of Manuilov’s house revealed that he was 
negotiating the sale of numerous compromising Okhrana documents to Burtsev in Paris and to 
A.V.Rumanov of Russkoe slovo. 
60 Kryzhanovskii, Vospominaniia, pp.100-03; V.N.Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo: Vospominaniia, vol.II 
(Paris, 1933), pp.9-10. Chernovskii, Soiuz russkogo naroda, pp.75. 
61 Rawson, Russian Rightists, p.145. 
62 Gerasimov, Na lezvii, pp.48 & 156. 
63 See: ‘Iz Dnevnika A.V.Romanova za 1916-1918gg.’ Krasnyi arkhiv, vol.26, pp.198-99: on the 
apocryphal account of Rachkovskii establishing the URP. 
64 Witte, Vospominaniia, p.432. 
65 GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1915g., d.244, t.1, l.20. According to this he served from 1899 to 1906. See also 
Gerasimov, Na lezvii, p.150; & PTsR, vol.III, Dopros Komissarova, p.143. After flight of Polovnev 
Iakovlev became head of the Society of Active Struggle with Revolution. See: GARF, f.111, op.5, d.363, 
ll.65-66, 14 May 1912 (On Iakovlev still working for StPbOO in 1912). 
66 B.Nikol’skii, ‘Dnevnik, 1905-07’ Krasnyi arkhiv, vol.36 (1934), p.86. 
67 See, for example: PTsR, vol.VI, Dopros N.E.Markova, p.179. On roots of URP, see: Katorga i ssylka, 
no.5 (34) 1927, pp.83-86. 
68 Gerasimov, Na lezvii, p.53. See also Hans Rogger, ‘Was there a Russian Fascism? The Union of the 
Russian People,’ Journal of Modern History [JMH], vol.36 (Dec. 1964), p.401. 
69 PTsR, vol.VI, Dopros N.E.Markova, pp.176-77. 
70 Rawson Russian Rightists, p.60. 
71 GARF, f.102, op.260, d.13, l.441, DPOO circular, 24 Dec.1905. 
72 Gurko, Features and Figures, p.437. 
73  E.g. on I.Ia.Gurliand see: Abraham Ascher, ‘Prime Minister Stolypin and his Jewish Advisor,’ Journal 
of Contemporary History, vol.30 (1995), pp.515-32. 
74 GARF, f.102, DPOO 1906g., d.828, ch.1, ‘Nariad po sekretnoi perepiske,’ l.22; GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 
1914g., d.244 ch. ‘Soiuz russkaogo naroda i drugie patrioticheskie partii.’ 
75 Iu.K.Kir’ianov, ‘Mestnye organizatsii pravykh partii v Rossii nakanune fevralia 1917,’ Otchestvennye 
arkhivy, no.6 (1995), pp.52-59; & ‘Perepiska pravykh i drugie materialy ob ikh deiatel’nosti v 1914-1917,’ 
Voprosy istorii, no.1 (1996), pp.113-15. 
76 See for example, GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1905g., d.999, ch.39, ll.31-34. 
77 Gerasimov, Na lezvii, pp.151, 154 & 155. 
78 See: Hoover, Okhrana Collection, Box 158, folder 11, Top Secret circular, 24 Feb.1912; & Stepanov, 
Zagadki, p.260- for Trusevich’s severe criticism of volunteer security detachments. 
79 On counter-terror priority see: Hoover, Okhrana archive, DPOO to Foreign Agency, dispatch no.1294, 
xivd, folder 1a. See also Hoover, Nicolaevsky collection, Box 205, folder ‘Lopukhin,’ Protokol no.37, 
pp.59-66. 
80 GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1905g., d.999, ch.39, ll.5-6, & 71-2; GARF f.102, op.236, d.8, ch.66, t.2, ll.132-
33; Rawson, Russian Rightists, pp.130 & 147.  
81 Gerasimov, Na lezvii, p.83. 
82 GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1908g., d.511, l.3, Chernigov Gendarme chief to DPOO, 19 Oct.1906. 
83 P.N.Miliukov, Vospominaniia, 1859-1917, vol.II (New York, 1955), p.433. Witte, Memoirs, vol.III, 
chpt.2, p.636. 
84 Rawson, Russian Rightists, p.144. Krasnyi Arkhiv, vol.32 (1929), p.180. MVD called for surveillance of 
and restrictions on rightist activities: GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1905 g., d.999, ch.39, t.1, ll.63, 401 & t.2, 
l.173. Gerasimov claimed Stolypin forbade any co-operation with the URP and directed condemnation of 
terror at the right as much as at the left (Na lezvii, pp.148, 151 & 159). 
85 For example, Petrunkevich’s famous advice to Miliukov not to agree to Stolypin’s request that he write 
an article in Rech’ condemning left-wing terror as it was ‘better to sacrifice the party than disgrace it.’ 
P.N.Miliukov, Vospominaniia (Berlin, 1938), vol.I, pp.430-31. See also: I.V.Gessen, ‘V dvukh vekakh: 
                                                                                                                                            
zhiznennyi otchet’ Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii, vol.22 (1937), p.144; Melissa Kirschke Stockdale, ‘Politics, 
Morality and Violence: Kadet Liberals and the Question of Terror,’ Russian History, vol.22 (Winter 1996), 
p.455-80; & chapter 7 of Anna Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917 
(Princeton, New Jersey, 1993). 
86 See: E.H.Judge, ‘Urban Growth and Anti-Semitism in Russian Moldavia,’ in Judge & J.Y.Simms Jr. 
(eds.) Modernisation and Revolution: Dilemmas of Progress in Late Imperial Russia (New York, 1992), 
pp.43-57. 
87 Figes, A People’s Tragedy, pp.193-96. 
88 GARF, f.124, op.65, d.26, l.57, Kopiia pokazaniia T.A.Zapol’skogo v Kiveneppskom sude 8 avgusta. 
89  Pravo, 20 Sept. 1909, no.38, V.Vodovozov article, col.2013. GDSO, 3rd Duma, 2nd session, zas.111, 12 
May 1909, cols.1125-37. Duma interpellation on police connections to the Herzenstein murder. For police 
report on this see: GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1908g., d.511, ll.137-39: 17 May 1909. 
90 Ibid., l.142, DPOO spravka. A.S.Izgoev, ‘Pravye terroristy,’ Russkaia mysl’, vol.X, part 2, 1909, pp.172-
81: names the entire druzhina as members of the Okhrana. 
91 See for example: E.E.Smith interview with Nikolai Veselago, 30 Jan. 1962. Hoover, E.E.Smith 
Collection, Box 1, p.3. 
92 GARF, f.102, op.260, d.17, l.342, DPOO circular 10 Dec.1907. 
93 GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1908g., d.511, l.139, St Petersburg OO to DPOO, January 1912. 
94 Pravo, 26 Aug. 1907, no.34, ‘Finliandskii sud.’ Col.2270-72: On agent ID cards and confirmation by the 
head of the Finnish gendarme directorate, Col.Legat. 
95 Pravo 20 Sept. 1909, no.38, ‘Finliandskii sud,’ col.2011. 
96 Pravo, 1 July 1907, no.26, col.s 1857-63. URP defector, Zorin, stated only two people to his knowledge 
used this pseudonym- Lev Topolev and Komissarov. Zapol’skii claimed that he did not recognise Topolev.  
97 PTsR, vol.I, Pokazanie V.L.Burtseva, p.320. Pochaev was Iliodor’s monastery. 
98 Pravo, 1 July 1907, no.26, col.s 1854-67. S.Aleksandrov and Topolev were tried in 1907. Topolev was 
cleared but spent some time in prison all the same after being arrested for drunk and disorderly following 
post-trial celebrations! Polovnev arrested June 1908 and tried sentenced to six years in Oct. 1909. June 
1909- Kraskovskii arrested in Tver in June 1909 and extradited to Finland. (Pravo, no.36, 6 Sept.1909, 
cols.1907-08). Larichkin was extradited to Finland 12th August 1909. In 1911 he stood trial in Russia for 
the Mukhin murder. Polovnev and Kraskovskii were pardoned by the tsar on 30 Dec. 1909. GARF, f.1467, 
op.1, d.862, l.14. Polovnev to Provisional government Investigatory Committee. 
99 Lensman was the state’s prosecutor. Baron Langenshel’d represented Herzenstein’s widow. Weber and 
Gruzenberg pursued most of the investigations on their behalf. Prince Volkonskii was defence. 
100 The 28 June 1907 Rech’ version of Witte assasination attempt only implicated the URP. It was in 
Herzenstein-murder trial in summer 1907 that police contacts with the URP began to be uncovered. See 
Rech’ Aug. to Oct. 1909. Gruzenberg, Vchera, pp.135-41. Pravo, no.36, 6 Sept. 1909, cols.1906-07.)  & 
no.38, 20 Sept. 1909, col. 2014.  
101 GARF, f.102 op.295 1910g. d.125, ll.27-30: Ex-URP member Aleksandr Tkhor testified to 
P.Aleksandrov to conversation overheard at the end of 1906 between three other members, Vlasov, Fedotov 
and Komissarov, in which they discussed murdering Witte. Komissarov denied this. 
102 GARF, f.102 op.295, d.125, ll.8 ob- 10. Most of the information on Kazantsevs movements came from 
his mistress (Evdokiia Illirionova), her sister, and Fedorov’s mother (Natalia Fedorova).  
103 Information collected by Weber and P.Aleksandrov: Ibid., ll.40-42. 
104 Ibid., ll.10-13. 
105 GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1908g., d.511, ll.125-29. 
106 Witte, Vospominaniia, pp.417-18; & pp.414-25 for Witte’s entire account. 
107 Gerasimov, Na lezvii, pp.152-53. 
108 Witte letter to Stolypin, GARF, f.102, op.295, d.125, ll.7 & 21. A caricature of Witte placing the bomb 
in the chimney himself appeared in a Helsinki newspaper (reported by Prussakov in Russkoe znamia in 
March 1907). Kelepovski repeated this accusation in the Duma on 10 Nov. 1908, claiming it was a form of 
‘self-advertisment.’ 
109 For Stepanov’s testimony given in 1917, see: GARF, f.1467, op.1, d.862, l.87 ‘Protokol doprosa 
A.S.Stepanova.’  See also: A.Chernovskii (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda (Moscow, 1929), pp.58-62; & 
pp.54-55 for Polovnev’s version of events. 
                                                                                                                                            
110 Kazarinov confessed to making the bombs in Birzheviia vedomosti, 16 May 1912. His initials have been 
given as V.N. and V.V. See Witte, Vospominaniia, pp.414-25. 
111 GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1908g., d.511, ll.142-43. DPOO report on the Duma accusations of May 1909. 
The chief supplier of arms to the URP in the capital was Iakovlev 
112 GARF, f.1467, op.1, d.862, Dopros A.I.Prussakov, 9 June 1917, l.63. The amount is sometimes given as 
6000. Prussakov also claimed that he saw them leave with pockets bulging with money. See Pravo, 20 
Sept. 1909, col.2014. 
113 Witte, Vospominaniia, pp.436-37. GARF, f.102, op.295, d.125,l.47ob., Aleksandrov report May 1910. 
114 GARF, f.102, op.DPOO1908 g., d.511, l.131, 3 Oct.1907. Culprits named as Volkovich and Kholin. The 
passport was originally filed away by Capt. Kolokolov and his assistant K.V.Varanov. They were 
questioned on the matter but not charged or punished. 
115 GARF, f.102 op.295, d.125 ll.5-13. 
116 His name was I.V.Toropov. Ibid., ll.41-47: P.Aleksandrov report. 
117 Znamia truda, 19 June 1907; GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1905g., d.999, ch.39, ll.128 & 160; GARF, f.102, 
op.DPOO 1908 g., d.511, ll.114-15 & 129-30. 
118 Ibid., l.76. St.Pb. OO investigators named them as Zhigilev, Aleksinskii and Romanov. 
119 Znamia truda, 19 June 1907; GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1908g., d.511, l.76. 
120 It is possible that Petrov and the two of the Duma deputies were also present at the time of the murder. 
121 Znamia truda, 19 June 1907; GARF, op.cit., l.130. 
122 Ibid., ll.20-21. Petrov contributed to the original SR publication on the affair in Znamia truda 19 June 
1907 under the pseudonym ‘Ivanov’ and published a letter in Rus’ 14 July 1907. Fedorov gave an interview 
to the famous terrorist Gershuni. StPbOO intercepted a piece of correspondence from Fedorov in 1909 to a 
Duma representative Polozhaev offering to sell him photographs of Kazantsev ‘dead and alive.’ 
123 Ibid., ll.160-61, 12 June 1911. 
124 Ibid., Paris Agentura reports 12 June 1911 and 8 June 1912. 
125 Ibid., ll.140-41; GDSO, 3rd Duma, 2nd session, zas.111, 12 May 1909, cols.1125-37. 
126 Police suspected Miliukov of moving closer to Burtsev 1911-13 and compiling: ‘documentary evidence 
that the police, using their unlimited power, arranged terrorist acts.’ f.102, op. DPOO 1913 g., d.260, ll.14-
17 1912 Miliukov co-operated with SDs and SRs on this. See also : L.L’vov, “Sem’ let nazad,” Russkaia 
mysl’, Feb. 1914, pp.48-51 & 60-61; & Burtsev’s Budushchee, 25 May 1912. 
127 GARF, f.102, op. DPOO1908 g., d.511, l.163. DP report May 1912 linked Witte to A.V.Rumanov and 
A.L.Stembo aiming to publish a daily paper on Okhrana malpractice under the sponsorship of Sytin. 
Rumanov also used Witte as the main source on articles exposing police links to the Holy Brotherhood. 
See: Russkoe slovo,1 March 1915. 
128 PTsR, vol.VI, Dopros Reinbota, p.126. PTsR, vol.II, Dopros Manuilova, p.44. For example of Witte’s 
paranoia see: Witte, Memoirs, p.635. 
129 For Moscow investigations see: GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1905g., d.999, ch.39, ll.129-65; for St 
Petersburg enquiries see: Vestnik narodnoi svobody 30 Aug. 1907, col.1570. And on police interrogating 
local chimney sweeps: GARF, f.102 op.295, d.125, l.47.   
130 GARF, f.102, DPOO 1908g., d.511, ll.74-75: St. Petersburg OO spravka, 6 Feb.1908. 
131 Hoover, Okhrana archive, Box 34, folder 5a, p.4, memo no.124130. GARF, op.cit., ll.83 & 88. He was 
located living in Paris under the pseudonym: ‘Monsieur Alko’ ! 
132 Witte, Vospominaniia, p.420; Gerasimov, Na lezvii, pp.150-51. 
133 Ibid., pp.154 & 196: On Iollos and Karaev murders and Gerasimov’s suggestion that Moscow OO 
officials had allowed terrorist attacks (on one occasion with dummy bombs) to occur in the past. 
134 Ibid., p.153. 
135 Znamia truda, 19 June 1907. 
136 GARF, f.102, DPOO 1908 g., d.511, ll.122-23. 
137 PTsR, vol.VI, Dopros Reinbota, p.122. 
138 GARF, f.102, op.260, d.23, DPOO circular, 20 Feb. 1909, l.72b. Hoover, Okhrana archive, Box 158, 
folder 10, 26 Nov.1910. 
139 PTsR, vol.III, Dopros M.S.Komissarova, p.150. 
                                                                                                                                            
140 A.P.Martynov, Moia sluzhba v otdel’nom korpuse zhandarmov (Stanford, 1972), pp.118 & 262-63; 
Shchegolev, Okhranniki, p.225- on I.P.Vasil’ev’s claim that they formed a ‘parallel’ Department of Police 
in conjunction with Kurlov. See also: Gerasimov, Na lezvii, p.21. 
141 See Chernovskii, Soiuz russkogo naroda, pp.75 & Kryzhanovskii, p.100-01. 
142 Hoover, Nikolaevskii collection, Box 203, Folder ‘Komissarov,’ Obshchee delo, 28 July 1921. 
143 Martynov, Moia sluzhba, p.312. However, this may have been yet another example of the secret police 
succumbing to ‘interpretative paranoia.’ Komissarov said he invented the story himself to hide the fact that 
he backed out because rumours of the imminent assassination had spread too far: NYT, 19 Oct. 1924. 
‘Vospominaniia S.P.Beletskogo,’ Arkhiv russkoi revolutsii, vol.XII pp.64-65. As a candidate for ‘Dictator 
of Petrograd’ in early 1917 he was one of the many shadowy figures rumoured to have ordered the placing 
machine guns on the Petrograd rooftops in February 1917. For Komissarov’s denials see PTsR vol.III, 
p.166. 
144 Hoover, Wrangel Military Archive, file 136, Azbuka report from Rostov, 14 May 1919: on reports of 
Komissarov operating a protection racket for Rostov’s casinos.  
145 See: Russkoe delo, 9 Nov. 1921; Novoe russkoe slovo, 16th Nov.1933; Novoe vremia 4 & 26 Nov.1924; 
Hoover, Nicolaevskii, Box 204, Folder ‘Kitchener;’ & Box 203, folder ‘Komissarov.’ On his work in 
Kislovodsk during Civil War with Chechen explosives experts cutting off the White retreat. 
146 Za svobodu, 12 Dec. 1922. See also Globachev letter to NYT, 14 Dec. 1924, II, p.5, col.3. He allegedly 
betrayed retreating White armies to the Stambulinsky government of Bulgaria in 1922 (having settled there 
in 1921 after being exiled from Yugoslavia and Hungrary and conned money from various European 
industrialists based on bogus claims to being Wrangel’s chief of intelligence). He even died in unusual 
circumstances: hit by a tram in Chicago on 20 Oct. 1933: Novoe russkoe slovo, 16 Nov. 1933. 
147 Witte, Vospominaniia, p.430. 
148 For a full version of the letter dated 3 May 1910, see: GARF, f.102, op.295, d.125, ll.3-21. 
149 Ibid., ll.19-20. 
150 Witte, Vospominaniia, p.438. Stolypin sent a written reply on 12th Dec. 1910. 
151 A phrase coined by Umberto Eco in connection with his satire of conspiracy theorists: Foucault’s 
Pendulum. 
152 P.N.Miliukov, Rossiia na perelome (Paris, 1927), pp.35-36. 
153 On police watching police: GARF, f.111, op.5, d.363, ll.109 & 113, St PbOO to DPOO, 12 & 30 
October 1912. Hoover, Nicolaevsky Collection, folder ‘Chrezvychainaya,’ Dopros Beletskogo, pp.27-28. 
Gerasimov’s contacts in the Petersburg Okhrana, Peshkov and Dobroskok, were placed under surveillance. 
PTsR, vol.I, Dopros E.K.Klimovicha, pp.108-09; Gerasimov, Na lezvii, pp.175-76. 
154 Hoover, Okhrana Collection, Boxes 42, 92-99, 210-21 & 143 (folder 1c p.453, March 1911). 
155 E.g. He was suspected of involvement in the Witte attack purely because he lost of one of the 
threatening letters: GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1908g., d.511, ll.35 & 55 (DPOO reports 16 Jan.1909 & 
Feb.1909). On later suspicions in the murder of Col.Karpov see: GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1914g., d.360, O 
general-leitenante Gerasimove; & Shchegolev, Okhranniki, pp.223-24. 
156 Gerasimov, Na lezvii, pp.170-76. 
157 Kurlov, Gibel’, p.112. 
158 Lopukhin claimed that Witte had once obliquely suggested that the political police, through deliberate 
security mishaps, could be useful as an organisation for the assassination of political opponents, and 
perhaps for replacing the tsar himself: Lopukhin, Otryvki, p.73. 
159 For example, Kazantsev’s next target, Bel’skii, was later to be recruited as a spy for Moscow OO after 
his arrest on 9 Jan. 1909. See: Hoover, Nicolaevsky Collection, box 1, file ‘Arkhiv Sledstvennoi komissii,’ 
Pokazanie Doktora Bel’skago. One of the Duma deputies who foiled the second attack on Witte was 
Andrei Romanov, later to be one of the Okhrana’s leading agents (codename ‘Pelageia’) close to Lenin: 
PTsR, vol.V, pp.61 & 237; Martynov, Moia sluzhba, pp.49-50. 
160 GARF, f.102, op.DPOO 1908g., d.511, ll.122-23, MOO to DPOO, 8 July 1907.  
161 GARF f.102 op.295 d.125 l.52, P.Aleksandrov report. 
162 PTsR, vol.I, Dopros Klimovicha, p.106. 
163 E.g. St Petersburg City Governors- Dediulin and Launtiz. See: GARF, f.1467, op.1, d.853, ll.29-30. 
Gerasimov (Na lezvii, p.151) noted: ‘Launitz’s actions had powerful supporters in the upper echelons of the 
imperial court.’ GARF 102 op.295, d.125, l.8 ob. 
                                                                                                                                            
164 E.g. Abbot Arsenii of Iaroslavl’, Bishop Germogen of Saratov, the monk Agafador of Kursk and 
Chernigov, the monk Iliodor of the Pochaev monastery in Volynia and father Ioann of Kronstadt. 
165 See: Witte, Vospominaniia, pp.415-16 & 423. Gurko, Features, pp.457-58. Nikol’skii, ‘Dnevnik,’ p.88. 
PTsR, vol.VI, Dopros A.A.Reinbota, p.126. On the tsar’s relief at Witte’s death see: Nicholas to Alexandra, 
28 Feb.1915 in The Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra, 
ed. J.T. Fuhrman (Westport, Connecticut, 1999), p.83. 
166 NYT, 2nd Nov. 1924, no.2, sectn.8, p.6, col.1. 
